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Abstract.
Access to Space for small R&D payloads is one of the key enablers for innovative space technology development.
For a vibrant space R&D environment to exist space access needs to be available on a regular basis at a cost
commensurate with R&D program budgets and with a minimum of custom interface requirements. The United
States has a long heritage of developing new technologies for space applications, enabled by numerous space
launches in the early 1960s. Many space experiments are launched as secondary payloads due to their relatively
small mass and modest program budgets. NASA and DoD have organized processes to evaluate and select
experimental payloads for space access (such as the DOD Space Test Program’s SERB). The payload interfaces are
usually custom-made for each payload and are scheduled on a case-by-case basis depending on primary payload
excess margins and acceptance of secondary payloads. The International space community has taken a dramatically
different approach since the early 1990s with the introduction of a regularly scheduled standardized launch interface
for secondary payloads – the Ariane Structure for Auxiliary Payloads (ASAP). Nearly 30 free-flyer secondary
payloads have been launched from ASAP since its introduction over 10 years ago. In comparison, the US STP
program has only launched an average of 1 free-flyer per year since its inception in 1965. Is this disparity in
secondary payload launch rates a cause for concern for the US space R&D community? Is the US losing ground to
the International space community as a leader in the introduction of new space technologies? Regularly available
space access is a key factor in the rapid introduction of new space technologies. If a country such as the US is
experiencing a slower rate of experimental payload launches compared to the International community, then the US
may be at risk of losing its leadership role in space technology. This paper will explore the background history,
supporting data and space access capabilities necessary to evaluate such a concern. The paper will propose potential
approaches to improve the US capability for support of space R&D.
accept risk as part of the R&D space payload launch
process. The cost of failure would be mitigated by
the lower cost of testing and the smaller size of
higher-risk test payloads. The process would achieve
dramatic benefits from more frequent iterations of the
development cycle, even when failure occurs. Space
test programs have almost forgotten that failure
should be an integral part of any research program.
Secondary payload risk must be balanced against the
overall risk allowable by the primary payload. There
are approaches available to address secondary
payload risk minimization prior to launch vehicle
separation.

1.0 Background
The current US approach to space test involves a
tightly coupled loop of risk averse (higher reliability)
processes driving higher launch/payload costs which
leads to fewer missions. Such an environment
discourages space research payloads. Because there
are fewer missions, the pressure for success on each
mission increases and the risk-averse environment
becomes more conservative spiraling the space test
process downward or directly opposite to what is
needed for a healthy research and development
environment. Downward is used here to describe a
direction that is away from a high frequency, rapid
turnaround space test process environment. This
downward spiral was well described by Sellers and
Milton.1

Jim Wertz presented his overview of this new
paradigm in a 2001 paper2, summarized in the Figure
1 below. The first “Circle” in this graphic depicts
where the US space test program is now, taken from
Sellers and Milton. The second “Circle” in the
graphic depicts where we need to be in the US Space
Test Program as suggested by Wertz.

In order to reverse this downwardly spiraling process,
the paradigm of space testing needs to be changed
dramatically to encourage more frequent low-cost
space experiments. A new paradigm would have to
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Figure 1 – Changing the Space R&D Process

•

If the lower circle defines the desired process, then
how do we get there? This paper attempts to provide
answers through a series of focused questions, such
as:
• Are there any specific impediments to Space
R&D (why is Space R&D so difficult)?
• Does the rest of the International Space
Industry perform space R&D in a similar
manner?
• What is the business case for the US
Aerospace Industry
• Is this a case of solutions looking for
problems?
• Who is interested in Space R&D?
• Where can the Space Market Grow?
• What are the current launch opportunities?
• What’s the next step? (and a Sample
Process)
• What is the Incentive?
• Summary – or Where do We go from Here?

The last factor alone would be unacceptable for any
ground-based R&D program.
Space R&D is not unlike ground based R&D in the
basic approach. Both follow the Scientific Method:
1) Observe a phenomena, 2) Develop a hypothesis on
how it occurs, 3) Test the hypothesis, 4) Repeat until
test agree with actual phenomena. Experiments are
developed based on observations and are often
developed before launch opportunities are defined or
obtained.
R&D payloads are launched as
“piggyback” on other missions/launch vehicles, often
resulting in a non-optimum orbit.
Secondary
payloads are ejected from launch vehicle after the
primary payload is delivered and have to accept the
primary payload orbit.
Embedded experiments that are part of a larger R&D
spacecraft seldom achieve orbits that are optimum for
R&D mission. R&D payloads seldom have onboard
propulsion for orbit adjustments once they are
deployed from the primary launch vehicle (to
minimize risk). Launch vehicle failures can “wipe
out” years of payload development effort, which
discourages testing of high-risk concepts in space.
Putting this in the context of the scientific method,
the Table 1 below provides a comparison of ground
and space-based R&D. Space R&D is truly harder
than ground-based R&D

2.0 Why is Space R&D Difficult?
Compared to ground or even airborne research and
development processes, space R&D has a number of
unique constraints that make it more difficult to
conduct. Included are:
• Costs are high ($10-20K per pound to LEO)
• Frequency of testing is low
• Opportunities for small payloads to achieve
desired orbits are few and far between
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Scientific
Method

R&D on the
Earth

R&D in
Space

1. Observe

•

Straightforward
in situ

•

Difficult in
situ – often
done remotely

2. Develop
Hypothesis

•

Develop based
on Many
observations

•

Develop based
on limited
observations

3. Test
Hypothesis

•

Straightforward
and “hands-on”

•

Very difficult,
costly, and
done remotely

4. Iterate 3 & 4

•

Iteration cycle
in days to
weeks

• Iteration cycle
in years

until data matches
hypothesis

Table 1. Why Space R&D is harder than ground-based R&D

secondary payloads than STP.3
3.0 Comparison of US to International Space
R&D

Why is Ariane apparently doing a much better job at
launching their payloads? Many papers have been
written on this subject, but there is general agreement
that the regularly scheduled and frequent availability
of standardized secondary payload launch interfaces,
at a reasonable cost, are the basis for their
significantly better R&D payload launch record than
US programs. The recent approval by the European
Space Agency (ESA) to “finance the infrastructure
that will be needed to launch Russian-built Soyuz
rockets from Europe’s spaceport in South America
(French Guiana)” could further enhance ESA’s
competitive position for launch of primary and
secondary payloads. 4

It could be useful to look at how Space R&D is done
outside of the US and determine if it is being done
better or worse than in the US. The parallel issue is
whether we are losing ground to the International
Community in our ability to do R&D in Space.
If the same constraints for space R&D exist for the
US and International space industries, then why
would we expect any differences in their respective
space R&D performance records. Turning this
thought around, if there are differences in their
performance records, then the differences in the
program approaches for US and International space
R&D could be illuminating. Let’s take a look at the
records of two prominent space test programs, the
DoD Space Test Program (STP) and the European
Space Agency (ESA) Ariane Auxiliary Structure for
Secondary Payloads (ASAP). Table 2 summarizes
each of these programs and indicates that ASAP has a
nearly 240% better record in launching free-flyer
•
•
•
•
•
•

STP started in 1965
Launched 37 Free-Flyer
Missions to Date (thru ’02)
Rate of 1 per year
Custom Interface
Ad-hoc launch
opportunities
Cost subsidized by DoD
Strong success story in
DoD spacecraft heritage
–
–
–
–
–

Milstar
DSCS
GPS
DMSP
DSP

4.0 Where is the Business Case?
Then what is the problem? The US continues to
conduct space R&D, but at a slower rate than the
international community. Many business textbooks
stress that the organization that can get to market
•
•
•
•
•
•

ASAP First Launch in 1990
Launched 26 Free-Flyer
Missions to Date (thru ’00)
Rate of 2.36 per year
Standard Interface
Scheduled launch
opportunities
Costs within reach of small
research organizations
ASAP has “bootstrapped”
several small countries into
the space business
–
–
–

South Korea
Portugal
South Africa

Table 2. Comparison of Launch Records
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sooner with more innovative products has a higher
chance of market leadership in the long run. Not all
of the attempts will result in success, but failure is
also a great teacher. This worked for the US in the
60s and 70s. An industry leading organization won’t
maintain its dominant position without continuous
infusion of new products and capabilities.
In
contrast, a start-up organization that conducts
frequent product development activities with an
iteration cycle between failure and the revised
approach that is sufficiently short can take away
market share from the incumbent organization. This
is because such an organization that accepts failure as
part of the R&D process can outperform a risk-averse
or mature organization and introduce better products
to the market more frequently.

Should the US be worried about its relative position
in the International Aerospace Industry? The
recently
completed
Presidentially
appointed
Commission on the Future of the US Aerospace
Industry had a specific charter of addressing this
point in several areas. The bottom line is that we
have a significant problem – US leadership is eroding
in the International Aerospace Industry. But if we
have a problem, they why isn’t the US Aerospace
Industry aggressively pursuing solutions? More
specifically, why don’t they increase the rate of space
R&D to gain back eroding market share and return us
to a position of dominance? The problem may lie in
the risk-averse nature of the US Aerospace Industry,
which hinders their ability to introduce innovation
and new technologies at a rate sufficient to maintain
market share. Much of our US Space Industry is
content to “ride out” the cash cow phase of the
business cycle, oblivious to the approaching business
cliff.
If the solution, introduction of a more
aggressive space R&D program, is so obvious, then
why isn’t it being implemented?

A typical business cycle for introduction of a new
product is shown in figure 2 below. Rapid growth
occurs during the initial startup phase if the product
has market viability. Once introduced, the product
transitions to the “cash-cow” phase of the business
cycle and a company gets a return on its R&D
investment. If the next generation of product is
started up before the “cash cow” phase ends on the
previous product, then an organization can establish
market position and possibly maintain market
dominance.

5.0 Solution Looking for a Problem?
A number of business development training programs
and textbooks point out that you can’t sell something
to a customer unless you are solving their problem(s).

Space Technology Business Cycle (notional)

non
-

US.

Revenue

U.S.

Time

R&D

Innovation

Mature Business (cash cow)

Figure 2. Notional Business Cycle
If you haven’t identified the customer with a problem
What differentiates the competent organization from
that fits your solution, then you don’t have any
the market leader is their ability to continually inject
chance of a successful “sale”. In many cases, the
new and profitable products into this business cycle,
potential customers are not even aware that they have
at a faster rate than the competition. Not all new
a problem, so there is an educational process
products or startup organizations succeed, but those
involved in identifying the problem for the customer
that do form the basis for a new product line and, in
before a solution (your solution hopefully) can be
some cases, an entire new industry. Risk -averse
proposed. This may sound like “motherhood and
organizations can be profitable, but they cannot
apple pie”, but it is a fundamental fact of business
maintain positions as industry leaders. Market
development that is often overlooked. To put this in
growth is “spurred” by innovation and new ideas.
context, why would a primary launch provider want
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to add a secondary payload adapter that would not
pay for itself and would introduce more risk for the
primary (and paying) payload(s). Why would a
government research organization want to develop its
own secondary payload launch adapter if it had other
less costly ways of obtaining one-off launch
opportunities for its unique test payloads?

payload launch interface?
I used the words
“sufficiently interested” because there are examples
of standardized US launch vehicle secondary payload
interfaces. Delta II is one of the most prominent and
one of the most prolific for NASA and DoD
payloads.
The Delta II secondary payload
performance is summarized in section 8.0. Why
aren’t the current EELV launch vehicle companies
(Lockheed Martin for Atlas V and Boeing for Delta
IV) interested in providing an ASAP-like (ASAP is
the ESA Ariane Auxiliary Structure for Secondary
Payloads) launch interface? The answer is simple – it
does not make a good business case, and in their view
it would create potential risk for the primary payload.

As a frequent participant in the annual AIAA/USU
Smallsat conference, I’ve asked myself the question,
“If there is such a vibrant source of new ideas and
innovation at the Smallsat conference, why don’t we
see more of these new ideas in space hardware?”
Many of you may have asked similar questions and
many have probably come up with the most probable
answer: Lack of access to space for small, innovative
payloads is a major impediment to Space R&D. It
brings most new concepts to a screeching halt or at
best relegates them to years on the shelf before a
launch is identified.

The difficulty lies in identifying the organization(s)
who have problems that can be solved by
implementing a new, standardized, regularly
scheduled secondary payload launch interface.
6.0 Where can the Space market grow?

Let’s discuss the innovation cycle described in the
beginning of the paper. Rapid low cost space
experiments with frequent launches on shorter
schedules leads to higher performance, lower cost,
more reliable space systems. What’s missing from
this triad? The answer is the lack of space access
(more space experiments launched on shorter
schedules).
Many designs and multiple business
approaches have been developed and implemented to
address the lack of space access for small, innovative
payloads. One Stop Satellite Solutions (OS cubed) is
one of the more recent examples that many of you are
familiar with. Their solution to the lack of US small
payload launch opportunities was to develop a
multiple payload launch adapter on a Russian launch
vehicle. Great idea, but many of the US payloads ran
into problems with export of technology restrictions
imposed by US ITAR (International Trade in Arms
Regulations).
The ITAR approval process
overwhelmed the payload integration and launch
process.

There are many technology applications and orbital
regions yet to be explored and applied. One example
is in the highly elliptical orbit belt that is currently
underutilized. Novel elliptical orbits have been
designed by individuals such as John Draim that
provide the continuous coverage of GEO with only a
few MEO satellites.5 A major problem is that the
satellites will have to regularly survive passage
through the Van Allen belt. Why not develop a more
thorough knowledge of the radiation environment by
“seeding” the belt with numerous small instruments
that can conduct measurements and/or test
components until failure. This could provide the
stimulus to open up a whole new segment of
commercial-service satellites for services such as
Broadband data. Launching “clouds” of small
satellites to instrument the Van Allen Belt would
require a secondary payload launcher interface. This
could be the “first user” application to pave the way
for regular secondary launch opportunities.
NASA Goddard’s Living With a Star Program
advocates research such as this and was very
receptive to initial discussions on the use of
radiation-measuring smallsats de-orbited from a GTO
launch capability.
Their program, summarized
below, could be the basis for development of a
standardized interface. The only thing lacking is
funding. Figure 3 below summarizes the NASA
GSFC Living With a Star Program.6

If innovation is to grow in the US at a rate that will
maintain (or even regain) our leadership in space
technology, then I maintain that the launch capability
for small, innovative payloads must be resident in the
US and readily available (schedule and cost) to small
R&D organizations and university research
programs. Anything less will not suffice.
So why aren’t the US launch primes sufficiently
interested to implement a regularly scheduled small
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Figure 3. The NASA/GSFC Living With a Star Program

the ones that are concerned with the erosion of US
Space technological leadership, the reduction in a
trained US space workforce, and the shrinking role of
the US in the international space marketplace. These
organizations provide the best opportunities for
advocacy. Advocacy without funding is a hollow
victory. The best “targets” are those organizations
that have a vested interest and have funding “clout”.
These are the “Big Gorilla” organizations. More
discussion is provided on how to deal with the “Big
Gorillas” in a later section.

7.0 Who are the Interested Parties?
The primary launch providers (Boeing, Lockheed
Martin) will be the principal interface for the
payloads, either directly or through a payload
interface/broker organization. This would lead most
to believe that the primary launch providers are the
organizations most interested in providing secondary
launch capabilities. The opposite is true. Launch
providers do not see a business case for small,
secondary payloads and are seldom willing to accept
the risk introduced by adding secondary payloads
onto a primary launch. So if the launch providers
aren’t the interested parties, then who is? Herein lies
the problem. Many proponents of standardized
secondary payload adapters feel that the launch
providers should “step up to the plate” and build
these interfaces. They have not looked beyond the
obvious relationship of payload to launch provider to
realize that they are addressing the wrong audience.
The real organizations that need to be addressed are
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The Secondary Payload launch process in the US is
essentially ad-hoc – there are no standardized launch
interfaces available on a regularly scheduled basis.
Table 4 below summarizes launch vehicles and
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placing secondary payloads into orbit.
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–
–

Launch Vehicles
•

–

Delta, Atlas, Titan

Dedicated Small
Launcher
•

–

Methods / Agents

Piggyback on EELVs

USAF/DOD Space
Test Program (STP)
•

Pegasus, Taurus,
Athena

Shuttle
•
•
•

Getaway Specials
(GASCAN)
Payload bay attach
points/launchers
Cross-deck payload
attachments (Spartan)

–
–

SERB (Space
Experiments
Review Board)
process to
prioritize and
select payloads

University launches
NASA
•

Small Explorer,
Shuttle

Table 4. Launch Vehicles and Methods

•
•

Many US launches have excess capacity
There is no incentive for the US Launch
industry to introduce secondary payload
capabilities
• Payload Managers would rather not
complicate their primary missions by adding
secondary payloads
To break this downwardly spiraling trend in US
Space R&D it will take a Government “Big Gorilla”
to step up to the plate. What or Who Is this “Big
Gorilla” organization? It should have many of the
following characteristics:

Delta II qualifies as the most prolific small,
secondary payload launcher – and comes the closest
in the US inventory to ESA’s Ariane IV in providing
a standardized secondary payload launch interface.
Table 5 below summarizes the Delta II performance
record for small, secondary payload launches. The
only problem is that the Delta II production line is
closing out and few opportunities remain for its use
as a secondary payload launch vehicle. NASA has
the orders for the bulk of the remaining Delta II
Launches.
SECONDARY
PAYLOAD
LOSAT-X
DUVE
SEDS-1
PMG
SEDS-2
SURFSAT
SEDSAT
Ørsted, SUNSAT
Munin

LAUNCH DATE

LAUNCH
SITE

PRIMARY
PAYLOAD

July 3, 1991
July 24, 1992
March 29, 1993
June 26, 1993
March 9, 1994
November 4, 1995
October 24, 1998
February 23, 1999
November 21, 2000

CCAFS
CCAFS
CCAFS
CCAFS
CCAFS
VAFB
CCAFS
VAFB
VAFB

Navstar II-11
Geotail
GPS-1
GPS-3
GPS-6
Radarsat
Deep Space 1
P91-1 ARGOS
EO-1/SAC-C

Table 5. Delta II Launch Record for Secondary Payloads7

•

9.0 Where Do We Go From Here?

•

Summarizing the current state of the US Space
Industry and more specifically, the US Space R&D
Industry, one can come to the following conclusions:
• The pace of US space R&D is falling behind
that of the International Space Community
• Ariane ASAP is outperforming STP
• Several Concepts exist for new, standardized
interfaces for secondary payloads
Horais

•
•
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an organization chartered to do high-risk,
high payoff space R&D
willing to change the space R&D paradigm
by implementing new payload interfaces for
secondary payloads
possessing the funding authority to
implement the needed changes
having a charter or objectives that can
support small R&D payload launches
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Once the capability of a regularly scheduled,
standardized interface and reasonable cost secondary
payload launch capability is made available on a
regular basis, the US Space R&D community will
respond with multiple payloads for space testing.

11.0 What is the Incentive
Why should the US Space R&D community and the
larger US Space industry be concerned about the lack
of opportunities for space R&D? To answer the
question, it must be posed in terms of the economic
impact on the US, the relative performance of the US
Space industry in the international community, and
the effect on the trained US aerospace workforce. If I
told you that an industry exists that provides return
on investments lower than government bonds and is
shrinking in market share (from a once dominant
position in the International market place), then what
would your prediction be for the future of this
industry?
Continued growth and a return to
dominance? Most, if not all of you would predict
exactly the opposite. The US Aerospace industry is
currently in the situation described above.

The approach is clear: identify the “Big Gorilla” first
user and develop a multiple small satellite launch
concept that becomes the solution to a problem
(current or unstated). Then convince the “Big
Gorilla” to fund the program as a solution to their
problem. Sounds simple, but then why hasn’t it been
accomplished by now? The answer may lie in the
inability of innovative organizations to articulate
their concepts so that the “Big Gorillas” will support
their programs. As a hypothetical approach, let’s
walk through a process with a potential customer.
10.0 A Sample Process

To put some factual “teeth” into this generalized
example recent statistics on the state of the US
Aerospace Industry were generated.
The
Presidential Commission on the Future of the US
Aerospace Industry completed their 12-month
assessment last fall and issued their findings in
November 2002 [insert reference]. The panel was
made up of 12 very senior experts in areas across a
broad range of factors involved in the US Aerospace
Industry. Included were former Congressmen, an
astronaut, a former Secretary of Defense and senior
financial analysts. Heidi Woods, the panel member
leading the “financial” analysis area presented some
sobering statistics on the financial state of the US
Aerospace industry. Figure 4 below summarizes
relative market performance of several industries
over a common period. Near the bottom of the stack
is the US Aerospace/Defense Industry, with a
MINUS 2.0 percent return over a 5-year period.8 Is
there a problem here? In addition to the poor
financial returns, the labor pool of new engineers and
scientists is eroding (some would say disappearing)
in the US Aerospace Industry. Development of a
more vibrant Space R&D environment may be a key
factor in recruiting more talent into this diminishing
workforce. The Aerospace Commission addressed
both factors of the dwindling labor pool and low
profit margins. Specific recommendations were
proposed in their final report, including increases in
the incentives (profits) for large Aerospace
Companies to support R&D activities.

Big Gorilla:
DARPA – a “venture capital”
organization for defense R&D
Problem to be solved: DARPA seeks innovative
technologies for tactical space applications.
Most projects are mission oriented, but some
component development activities exist that have
needs for space experiments to measure
environments
and
qualify
component
performance in space.
Space access is a
common thread for all DARPA space R&D
programs
Current Solution: DARPA uses the DOD Space
Test Program for space testing needs and also
pursues ad-hoc opportunities for space launch.
DARPA does not currently perceive a lack of
launch opportunities for their planned payloads
(i.e. where is the problem?). Also, they are not
at the stage of exploring new concepts that
would utilize smallsats on a regular basis where
they would need to plan for regularly scheduled
small payload launch opportunities.
What should be done:
Educate DARPA on
potential new missions for smallsats, and once
they agree on the need, develop a smallsat
program that requires a multiple payload launch
adapter. Do not expect DARPA to develop a
secondary payload adapter in the absence of a
“DARPA-hard” technology challenge.
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Total Five Year Return on Investment by Sector
(1997 – 2002)
Value today of $10000 investment made in 1997

The Aerospace Industry must be
able to attract vital capital at a
reasonable cost!

Figure 4. Aerospace Commission Comparison of Industry Profit Margins

Daniel Baker, Director of the Laboratory for
Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of
Colorado, Boulder, recently stated: “The continuing
vitality of the U.S. space research program is strongly
dependent on having cost-effective, reliable and
readily available access to space. The lack of
availability of a wide range of sub-orbital and orbital
flight capabilities severely hinders the ability of the
solar and space physics research community to carry
out leading-edge science programs, validate new
instruments and train new scientists.”9 He went on to
state: “Small spacecraft missions can be extremely
productive scientifically and can also provide a fertile
training ground for students of science and
engineering.”…”To push back the frontiers of
science, to train the next generation of scientists and
engineers, and to help enable small, focused space
missions we need access to space that is
commensurate in cost with the payloads we are
capable of building. The United States should use
every method at our disposal to make this access to
space a reality.”

If we maintain a business as usual approach to Space
R&D, then that is exactly where the US space
industry is headed. Maybe this is just a natural
evolution of technology cycles, like the Steam Age or
Consumer Electronics. I for one certainly hope not
when it comes to the US Space Industry.
11.0 Summary: Where Do We Go From Here?
The key points in this paper are:
We have a declining Space Industry in the US that
does not conduct a sufficient level of space R&D to
remain competitive in the International Space
Marketplace. A major impediment to space R&D in
the US is the lack of regularly available, scheduled
space access opportunities for R&D (secondary)
payloads. In order to correct the problem we need to:
1.
2.

Where do the small R&D payloads “fit” into the
overall Aerospace Industry? I maintain that they are
the foundation of future space capabilities. Without
them, there will be no new space technologies and
the current space capabilities will be overtaken by
newer and more effective approaches.
Daniel
Baker’s comments above echo this sentiment for the
space R&D community. To put this in the context of
a business life cycle, if new ideas and innovations are
not constantly being “incubated”, then there is a cliff
at the end of the business “cash cow” cycle that
marks the demise of an industry. Competitors who
have a better solution, as shown in figure 2 will
almost always overtake a mature industry.
Horais

3.
4.

5.

9

Identify the “Big Gorillas” with funding
and/or clout
You can’t sell something to someone unless
you are solving their problem(s)
Problem identification can be used to focus
on selected organizations – with funding
Once the funded organizations are identified
with the problems requiring smallsat
solutions, they must be approached in the
proper manner (proposal, briefing, white
paper)
If a match is formed between the
organization’s problem and the proposed
smallsat solution, then the organization can
serve as the “first provider” for a
standardized space access interface
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6.

Before the first provider has completed a
successful mission with the standardized
secondary payload interface, additional
users and funding organizations need to be
lined up to capitalize on the new space
access capability

6.
7.
8.

Where are the primary launch providers in this
process? For the “first provider” application, they
would be paid for all of the non-recurring
engineering and procedures development to add the
payload interface to a primary launch mission.
Beyond the first paid mission there must be a
business case established to keep the primary launch
providers interested in and motivated to provide a
regularly scheduled secondary payload launch
interface (profit driven, government offsets, first user
funding for non-recurring)

9.
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What are the missions that justify the first user? Two
have been discussed in this paper as examples:
•

Space radiation environment measurements
– “seed” the Van-Allen belts with
measurement instruments from a GTO
launch – use novel de-orbit techniques to
tailor the instrument orbits

•

Large arrays in space – use constellations of
small satellites to test our new concepts –
evaluate
the
network/comm./position
measurement issues before implementing in
larger platforms
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Opportunities,
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Rideshare Conference
Commission on the Future of the United
States Aerospace Industry, Final Briefing,
page 18, DEC 2002
Baker, Daniel N., Space News, June 2,
2003, Commentary: A Price Science Can
Afford, , page 16

Many more mission examples exist among the
smallsat community. Let’s get the process rolling!
I’m more than willing to serve as an interface to
organizations I support (such as DARPA). Other
organizational interfaces are needed. Time’s a
wasting….
References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Horais

Sellers and Milton, “The Fundamental
Problem of Space Mission Development”,
1996
Wertz, J., Microcosm,
“Changing the
Paradigm of Space Testing”, AIAA/USU
Smallsat 2001
COL White, USAF, STP Program Overview
Briefing, August 2002
deSelding, Peter B., Space News, June 2,
2003, “ESA …Tentatively Approves Soyuz
Launch Pad”, page 1
Draim, John, COBRA orbit constellation
paper, AIAA/USU Smallsat 2001
10

17th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

